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1Abstract
In its endeavour to attract foreign investment inflows and realise the diversity and 
security of its energy supply, Vietnam has set out short, medium and long term strategies 
which have been articulated in a number of legal instruments. These developments 
include the drive and acceleration of divestment and liberalisation of the energy market 
and ensuring healthy competition therein. This article provides a critical analysis of 
the current divestment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam’s oil and gas 
sectors. In doing so, it also assesses current state of affairs against the key principles and 
objectives of competition law. After providing a brief summary of the milestones in the 
oil and gas sector, the article explains the equitisation in and privatization of SOEs 
and critiques the implications of these practices against the benchmarks of competition 
law provisions. After identifying the current problems and future challenges that lie 
ahead, it provides a number of constructive recommendations for policy development 
and legal reform.
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1. Introduction
From the 1980s, onwards Vietnam pursued a central-subsidy economy
in which the government planned and directly intervened in the market 
through state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and administrative decisions. 
Accordingly, the Vietnamese economy was dominated by SOEs which 
enjoyed enormous privileges but were largely inefficient. The few 
competition rules that existed at the time in Vietnam were applied mainly 
to a minority of small private enterprises. There was, obviously, no room for 
the type of competition which is present in developed countries.1
The concept of market-based economy was addressed when the 
Vietnam Communist Party decided to carry out its Renovation (“Doi 
1 OECD (2018), OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Vietnam, p. 13, retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-law-and-policy-in-vietnam.htm [accessed 
17 June 2019]
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Moi”) policies to pursue the “socialist-oriented market economy”2 and to 
integrate with international trade through multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements.  One of the greatest changes in such economic policies was the 
recognition of variety of ownership of property and assets and economic 
sectors, i.e. Vietnamese government gradually adopted legal framework to 
create a more equal playing field for all economic players. In 2004, Vietnam 
adopted a comprehensive set of competition law provisions in connection 
with (but not required by) its accession process to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).3 The primary purpose of adopting competition law 
was to demonstrate to the world that Vietnam was  committed to a market-
based economic system that is interconnected internationally.4
During this period, Vietnam also recognised the contribution of pro-
trade (open market) and investment policies for boosting international trade 
and foreign direct investment (“FDI”). Particularly, the value of exports/
imports was US$21,500/22,800 million while the FDI into Vietnam rose 
by 6.2 percent year-on-year to US$7.3 billion in May 2019.5 Such progress 
and growth have been underpinned by key legal instruments, such as the 
2005 Law on Investment6 (repealed by the 2014 Law),7 which aims to 
ensure greater transparency and predictability of administrative procedures. 
In addition, through these legal instruments, capital investment has been 
increased by attracting more sophisticated investors, and the legal regime 
and remedies for resolving disputes among investors have been put in place.
As a result, the 2018 Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) ranked 
Vietnam as 77, jumping 21 places since 2016.8 All of these developments 
have had direct relevance for, and impact on, investment and competition 
in the energy (oil and gas/ petroleum) sector.
2 Resolution No. 21/NQ-TW dated 30 January 2008 of the Communist Party defined that 
‘Vietnam’s socialist-oriented market economy is an economic model, which both conforms to principles of the 
market economy, and is based on and guided by principles and nature of socialism in terms of the ownership, 
management organization and distribution. It comprises of many ownership types and economic sectors, 
in which the State-owned economy plays the vital role’. See also Resolution of the VI CPV National 
Congress (1987), National Political Publishing House, p. 86; Resolution of the VIII CPV National 
Congress (1996), National Political Publishing House, p. 72, 113; Resolution of the IX CPV 
National Congress (2001), National Political Publishing House, p. 86-88; Resolution of the XII 
(2016) CPV National Congress, retrieved from CPV Portal http://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.
vn/ban-chap-hanh-trung-uong-dang/dai-hoi-dang/lan-thu-xii/dai-hoi-dai-bieu-toan-quoc-
lan-thu-xii-cua-dang-cong-san-viet-nam-3 [accessed 28 June 2019].
3 The Law on Competition No. 27/2004/QH11 (2004), repealed by the Competition Law No. 
23/2018/QH14 (2018).
4 OECD (n 1)
5 Trading Economics, Vietnam – Economic Indicators (2019), retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.
com/vietnam/indicators [accessed 17 June 2019].
6 The Law on Investment No. 59/2005/QH11 (2005)
7 The Law on Investment No. 67/2014/QH13 (2014)
8 Trading Economics, Vietnam Competitiveness Rank, retrieved from https://tradingeconomics.
com/vietnam/competitiveness-rank [accessed 17 June 2019]. 
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Over the past 40 years since the Vietnamese Government and Italian 
contractor, AGIP, signed the first production sharing contract in 1978, FDI 
in the oil and gas sector has not only brought large revenues to the country 
but also laid important foundation for development of the energy sector. By 
November 2015, there were 105 oil and gas exploration and production 
contracts with foreign partners, amounting to more than US$45 billion in 
petroleum exploration and exploitation activities.9 Many large projects in the 
fields of gas, electricity, refining and petrochemical, and technical services have 
been brought on-stream to enhance development of the national economy 
and the industrialisation and modernisation of the country.10 In turn, actual 
and needed foreign investment flows have paved the need of a level playing 
field, increased the efficiency and competitiveness among key players.11
The second reform was restructuring of the SOEs for better efficiency 
and competitiveness. Apart from reorganising and incentivising those 
companies to follow the capital market rules, reforming of their ownership 
structure was also crucial. Without addressing this issue, the motivation for 
the SOEs to become more transparent, productive and competitive would 
have been significantly constrained.12 Against this backdrop, the government 
embarked on a plan in the early 1990s to equitise SOEs through four 
major phases: the 1992 – 1996 Pilot stage, the 1996 – 1998 expansion of 
Pilot programme, the 1998 – 2002 acceleration of ‘equitisation’13, and the 
continuing process currently. Over the last two decades, SOEs restructuring 
has been a key component of Vietnam economic reforms; nevertheless, it 
remains largely a work in progress.14
In August 2017, the government announced its ambitious plan to 
divestment 406 SOEs during the period of 2017-2020, comprised of many 
giants in key economic sectors such as agriculture, telecommunication, 
transportation, energy.15 In tandem with the above decision, Mr. Vuong 
9 VietnamNet (2018), ‘FDI lays foundation for acceleration of oil and gas sector’, 4 October 2018, 
retrieved from https://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/business/209633/fdi-lays-foundation-for-
acceleration-of-oil-and-gas-sector.html [accessed 21 April 2019].
10 Le, V.T, Pham, V.C. (2016), Overview of Vietnam oil and gas industry, 10 May 2016, retrieved 
from http://www.pvn.vn/Pages/detail.aspx?NewsID=f2a87c29-8c5e-4501-b203-7cdfb2b80976 
[accessed 21 April 2019].
11 Nguyen, V.T, Ogunlana, S.O. & Dey, P.K. (2007), “Risk management in oil and gas construction 
projects in Vietnam”, International Journal of Energy Sector Management, vol. 1 issue: 2, pp. 175-194, 
p.176, retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1108/17506220710761582 [accessed 21 April 2019].
12 Le, H.H. (2017), “Vietnam’s New Wave of SOE Equitization: Drivers and Implications”, 
ISEAS Perspective, issue 2017, no. 57, p. 2, retrieved from https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/
pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2017_57.pdf [accessed 21 April 2019].
13 Equitisation, in Vietnamese ‘Cổ phần hóa’, is a Vietnamese English term that denotes the 
conversion of a state-owned enterprise in Vietnam into a public (joint stock) company or a 
corporation. It means the same as privatisation in its usage in Vietnam.
14 Le, H.H. (n 12).
15 Decision No. 1232/QD-TTg of Prime Minister (2017) giving approval for list of SOEs 
undergoing divestment in the 2017-2020 period.
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Dinh Hue – the Deputy Prime Minister – signed the Document No. 1182/
TTg-DMDN dated 11 August 2017 approving the list of Vietnam Oil and 
Gas Group (PetroVietnam – “PVN”)’s subsidiaries to be equitised. As a 
result, the initial public offerings (IPOs) of three key energy companies, 
PetroVietnam Oil Corporation (PVOil), PetroVietnam Power Corporation 
(PVPower) and Binh Son Refinery Company (BSR) have been successfully 
launched in the first quarter of 2018.16
The envisaged benefits are that the State budget could overcome the 
fiscal deficit whereby public debt was very close to the permitted debt 
ceiling, comprised of inefficient use of public debts and shrinking room for 
fiscal policy. In the long term, the State needs to continually implement the 
SOEs restructuring, accelerate divestment of non-core businesses and focus 
on priority areas to address the pressing socio-economic issues.17
Given that the energy sector is top priority for economic growth 
and national security in Vietnam, there is no doubt that the role of two 
State-owned giants, Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group (“PVN”) and 
the Vietnam National Petroleum Group (“Petrolimex”) in terms of yearly 
State budget contribution and high ratio in Vietnam exported goods are 
important. Their businesses separately accounted for overall 16–18 percent 
of GDP while other State-owned enterprises (excluding the oil and gas 
industry) contributed about 42 percent of GDP.18 By holding stakes of 
such enterprises, the State is able to secure socio-political objectives, i.e. 
vary from ensuring national energy security, contributing to developing an 
independent and self-reliant economy to adequately supplying high-quality 
energy, developing an energy market which is conducive to fair competition 
and environmental protection.19
However, this sector has faced many tough challenges. Firstly, the 
depletion of natural resources of its main oilfields has put the PVN under 
great pressure to reach its oil exploration and production targets for 2018 
and thereafter.  Secondly, financing and access to credit from international 
institutions are getting harder while calling for foreign investments in large 
projects is likely to expose Vietnam to investment-related risks and disputes. 
Thirdly, the tariff elimination and “brain drain” of highly skilled labour 
16 Reuteur (2018), ‘PetroVietnam to raise more than US$570 million from three IPO subsidiaries in 
January 2018’, 15 January 2018, retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/brandfeatures/venture-
capital/article?id=25134 [accessed 17 June 2019].
17 Nhan Dan Newspaper (2019), ‘Vietnam accelerates divestment from State-owned enterprises’, 
8 January 2018, retrieved from http://en.nhandan.org.vn/business/item/5756902-vietnam-
accelerates-divestment-from-state-owned-enterprises.html [accessed 21 April 2019].
18 Le, V.T et al. (n 10).
19 VietnamNews (2019), ‘Tough challenges for oil, gas sector’, 27 September 2017, retrieved from 
http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/394510/tough-challenges-foreseen-for-oil-gas-sector.
html [accessed 21 April 2019]
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have become burdensome when the international trade and investment 
arrangements (e.g. WTO’s covered agreements) where Vietnam is one 
of member states came into effect.20 One of the targets of such oil and gas 
SOEs equitisation is thus to increase market competition while it is generally 
accepted that competition fostered by government’s policy is the driving force 
to enhance efficiency, quality, innovation and competitiveness of Vietnamese 
business players regionally and internationally.21
Regarding the above issues, the question on the relationship between 
privatisation process (SOEs divestment to pave the way for non-State economic 
sector’s engagement) and competition policy to enhance the economic 
efficiency in the government’s policy mix becomes crucial. Government’s 
key objectives would ultimately determine relationship between these two 
instruments. A rent-seeking policy that wants to extract rent from businesses 
chooses not to privatise profitable SOEs but put the excessive costs on private 
firms. A market-friendly government on the other hand, aims at levelling the 
playing fields between both public and private entities.22
In order to form a reasoned opinion and conclude on the future 
prospects of these recent initiatives, this paper summarises the progress of 
SOEs divestment and the engagement of foreign companies in Vietnam’s 
oil and gas industry. Next, it critically assesses the level of competition on 
to-be-equitised enterprises, particularly in the petrol retail market. Finally, 
it offers a number of recommendations for achieving the intended aims and 
creating a competitive energy market.
2. Equitisation23 in SOEs and engagement of foreign investment in
Vietnam’s oil & gas sector
2.1. The driving forces of the privatisation process
Foremost, the oil and gas sector is the top priority for economic growth 
and energy security where Vietnam has enormous potential for  large 
20 Ibid.
21 Singh, A. (2002), Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International and 
Developmental Dimensions, UNCTAD G-24 Discussion Paper Series no. 18, September 2002, p.7, 
retrieved from http://unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf [accessed 21 April 2019].
22 Vu, T.T.A. (2006), “Competition and Privatisation in Vietnam: Substitutes or Complements?”, 
Paper presented at the Conference of the Japanese National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies Tokyo, Japan, 15 July 2006, http://www.grips.ac.jp/vietnam/VDFTokyo/
Doc/2ndConf15Jul06/2EcoSession2VTTAnh.pdf.
23 Le,	H.H.	(n	12),	pp.2-3:	In	all	 the	official	documents,	the	process	 is	referred	to	as	“cổ	phần	
hóa	 (equitization)”	 rather	 than	 “tư	 nhân	 hóa	 (privatization)”.	 From	 the	CPV’s	 perspective,	
“equitization” is a more precise term as the state normally retains a large stake in most of the 
equitized SOEs, and only a limited amount of their shares are sold to private investors. Moreover, 
the term “equitization” carries a less negative ideological overtone. As the CPV still considers 
the state-owned sector the backbone of the “socialist-oriented market economy” that it strives 
for, the term “privatization” implies a deviation from its goal. Nevertheless, “equitization” and 
“privatization” are not clearly different in practical terms. Many non-essential SOEs have been 
wholly privatized, and the Vietnamese government has also reduced or completely divested its 
stakes in many equitized SOEs, effectively turning these firms into private entities.
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reserves. The extraction of petroleum resources have commenced three 
decades ago and Vietnam has substantially increased its overall production, 
with the accumulative 346 million tonnes of crude oil and 108 billion cubic 
meter of natural gas.24 In tandem with the exploration and production 
activities, the country has paid great attention to the development of refinery 
and processing facilities for  achieving the goals of national energy security 
(security of supply) as well as adequate and high-quality supply for economic 
growth.25 By 2007, the National Energy Development Strategy 2020, with 
an outlook to 2050, was approved by the Prime Minister, which set out 
several ambitious goals, inter alia the construction of oil refineries to rise the 
total capacity to 25–30 million tonnes of petrol and petrochemical products 
by 2020 in order to meet the domestic demand and pursue to export.26
Despite positive outlooks, the oil and gas industry has been facing 
tough challenges. Firstly, under the above development strategy towards 
2025, this sector aims to annually increase oil and gas reserves to 35-40 
million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE), increase oil and gas exploitation 
by 10-36 percent for each five-year period, compared to the current levels 
(approximately 24 million tonnes of crude oil in 2018).27 However, over 
more than 30 years, the major oil fields in Vietnam are in depleting phase 
that has put the PVN under great pressure to reach its oil exploration and 
production targets for 2018 and thereafter.28
Secondly, in terms of oil and gas projects, these are generally exposed 
to both internal risks and external risks. The internal risks are often related to 
financing,29 design, contractual, construction, involved parties and operational 
issues while the external risks generally emanate from security – political – 
24 PVN,	‘Exploration	and	Production’	(Hoạt	động	Khai	thác	Dầu	khí),	retrieved	from	http://
www.pvn.vn/Pages/detailv4.aspx?NewsID=5e1ae9ea-1ec3-4704-83e4-9b7614d04cee 
[accessed 21 April 2019].
25 Cong Thuong Newspaper (2016), ‘Vietnam Energy Forum 2016: Challenges for Sustainable 
Development’, 25 August 2016, retrieved from https://congthuong.vn/dien-dan-nang-luong-
viet-nam-2016-thach-thuc-cho-phat-trien-ben-vung-74115.html [accessed 17 June 2019].
26 Decision No. 1855/QD-TTg of Prime Minister on Approving Vietnam’s National Energy Development 
Strategy up to 2020, with the Outlook to 2050 (2007), Art.1.2, sub-section b), para.4.
27 Nang Luong Journal (2019),	‘Achievements	of	PVN	in	2018’	(Những	dấu	ấn	nổi	bật	của	PVN	trong	
năm	2018),	14	January	2019,	retrieved	from	http://nangluongvietnam.vn/news/vn/dau-khi-viet-
nam/nhung-dau-an-noi-bat-cua-pvn-trong-nam-2018.html [accessed 22 June 22, 2019].
28 Nguyen, H.T (2018), “Enhanced oil recovery in Vietnam: Potential and Opportunities”, 
PetroVietnam Journal, vol 6/2018, p. 83, retrieved from http://www.pvn.vn/DataStore/
Documents/2018/TapChiDauKhi/TCDK_6_2018.pdf [accessed 22 June 22, 2019].
29 Different financing models may be employed in energy projects; government financing, corporate 
financing, hybrid financing, project finance. Each brings with its different requirements and risk 
factors. While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine each model, some of the modern-
day financing methods are proposed as follows: Government-to-Government Financing, Loan 
Guarantee, Host Government-Backed Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), Vendor Financing, 
and Investor Financing. For detailed analysis see, Terlikowski P. et al. (2019), “Modern financial 
models of nuclear power plants”, Progress in Nuclear Energy, vol 110, pp. 30-33.
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legal status of host country, risks on economy, market conditions during the 
project operation, concerns over environmental and social impacts of such 
projects in certain geographical areas and on residents. Therefore, financing 
and access to credit from international institutions are getting harder while 
calling for foreign investments in large projects is likely to expose Vietnam 
to investment-related risks and disputes.30
Third, under the free trade agreements and commitments that Vietnam 
has signed, import tariffs on petroleum products would be zeroed out, 
affecting the domestic oil and gas industry. Particularly, the tariff rate for 
imported petrol from all WTO members (under the Most-Favoured Nation 
treatment) is 40%; however, the ASEAN Agreement in Goods (ATIGA) 
schedule has provided that such rate would be reduced to 20% since 2012, 
and to 0% by 2016.31 The Vietnam-Korean Free Trade Agreement has also 
ruled the preferred tariff applied for imported petrol would be 10% to 0% 
between 2016 and 2018.32
With the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
in addition to the tariff reduction, there would be a shift in the labour force 
within the industry, leading to “brain drain” for the sector. For example, 
some of PVN’s highly-skilled workers might move to other oil companies 
in ASEAN countries if they could offer better working conditions. The 
whole industry therefore needs to adjust and put forward a strategy so that it 
could compete with competitors locally and internationally.33
Vietnam exercises its ownership over the natural resources and confers 
the management of these to the national oil companies. Accordingly, the 
Petroleum law provides that:
“The Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (known in its international 
dealings as Petrovietnam) is a State-owned enterprise established by the 
Government of Vietnam to conduct petroleum operations and enter into 
petroleum contracts with organizations and individuals for the conduct of 
petroleum operations in accordance with this Law.”34
The company’s core businesses are comprised of entering into 
petroleum contracts with other entities, managing and supervising the 
exploitation, production of petroleum resources on the ground of such 
contracts.35 Particularly, it is mandated to allocate acreage by tendering 
30 Nguyen, V.T. et al. (n 11)
31 The ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), Annex 2 - Tariff Schedule of Vietnam, 
Schedule A, section 2705.
32 The Vietnam-Korea Free Trade Agreement (VKFTA), Chapter 2 - National Treatment and 
Market Access for Goods, Annex 2-A - Tariff Schedule of Vietnam, Schedule A, section 2710.
33 VietnamNews (n 19).
34 The Petroleum Law No. 18-L/CTN (1993), amended by Law No. 19/2000/QH10 (2000) and 
Law No. 10/2008/QH12 (2008), Art.14.
35 Decree 149/2013/ND-CP (2013), Art. 3.3.
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or direct negotiation with selected licensees or participate in the Joint 
Ventures, and act as the technical liaison with those licensees.36 It is virtually 
a business entity that refers to a player in revenue-generating activities,37 
yet the national oil company is also a mean for conducting the State’s non-
commercial duties which vary from ensuring national energy security, 
contributing to developing an independent and self-reliant economy to 
adequately supplying high-quality energy, developing an energy market 
which is conducive to fair competition and environmental protection.38 The 
importance of the energy sector often leads to direct intervention from the 
State based on political rather than an economic arguments and rationale 
thus resulting in substantial costs.39
The PVN’s report to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT)
revealed that the company has suffered from substandard operation including 
lack of effective coordination and cooperation among its departments. In 
comparison with other national oil companies in ASEAN region, PVN’s 
productivity only accounted by 10 – 50 percent of those in Petronas 
(Malaysia) and PTT (Thailand).40
Furthermore, the company has faced the “principal-agent problem” 
between governmental authorities (representative of Vietnamese nationals – 
the ultimate owners over the natural resources) and the board of directors. 
Endowing PVN with large non-commercial functions and powers could 
lead to take advantage of its positions in these realms and advance its own 
interests, which are not always be fully consistent with those of the country. 
In the worst scenario, conferring authority for allocation of exploration 
and production rights to the PVN can open a door for corruption.41 For 
example, unlawful acts of PVN’s and its subsidiaries’ board of management 
during 2006 – 2011 period were alleged, including the case of PetroVietnam 
36 Decree No. 149/2013/ND-CP on Charter of National Oil and Gas Group (PetroVietnam) 
(2013), Art. 3 of the Charter; Decree No. 95/2015/ND-CP detailing provisions of the Petroleum 
Law (2015).
37 Decision No. 199/2006/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister (2006) provided that: ‘PetroVietnam 
has its major functions and responsibilities following: b) Perform petroleum activities and enter into 
petroleum contracts with organizations, individuals who conduct the petroleum operation; […] c) Directly 
produce, do business in respect to commercial purposes in accordance with the laws […]’.
38 Decision No. 1855/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister (2007), Art. 1.2(a).
39 Tordo, S., Tracy, B.S, Arfaa, N. (2011), National Oil Companies and Value Creation, World 
Bank Working Paper no. 218, p.25.
40 Nguyen	Hai	(2018),	‘PVN’s	comprehensive	reform’	(PVN	‘đại	cải	tổ’	sau	hàng	loạt	lãnh	đạo	
vướng	vòng	lao	lý),	Tuoitre Newspaper, 16 April 2018, retrieved from https://tuoitre.vn/pvn-
dai-cai-to-sau-hang-loat-lanh-dao-vuong-vong-lao-ly-20180416073621657.htm [accessed 
23 June 2019].
41 Heller, P.R.P., Mahdavi, P. & Schreuder, J. (2014), Reforming National Oil Companies: 
Nine Recommendations, Natural Resource Governance Institute, p.8, retrieved from https://
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_9recs_eng_v3.pdf [accessed 21 
April 2019].
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Financial Corporation (PVFC),42 the VND800 billion-loss (approximately 
US$94 million) of PetroVietnam Construction Corporation (PVC) pouring 
into the OceanBank,43 and a  ineffective key project, Dinh Vu poly-fiber 
plant are three bio-ethanol projects.44
It is also worth noting that Vietnamese energy projects are often 
procured for foreign multinational oil companies because of the limited 
supply of capital and technological know-how nationally. Within the 1988 
– 2014 period, more than 40 international oil companies from the United
States, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, Malaysia, France, Spain, Canada,
and Australia have invested in both upstream projects and downstream
processing facilities through various types of contracts. While bringing
capital and modern technology to Vietnam, they have fostered the need for
market reform to create a level playing field and to facilitate the increased
engagement of private enterprises in the energy sector.45
These above facts however do not represent the whole picture of the 
Vietnam economy. The steady erosion in the productivity may be driven 
by two main factors: the institutional foundations for an advanced market 
economy are insufficiently developed, undermining private property rights; 
and competition in product markets where market factors are allocated 
and driven by fiat. Commercialized state institutions – whereby the State 
is directly involved in economic activities and indirectly involved through 
the influence of vested interests – have ensured that economic resources 
allocations are guided as much by arbitrary administrative decisions as by 
efficient market signals.46
Furthermore, Vietnam is experiencing new and emerging fiscal 
challenges, including narrower fiscal space, rising public debt and concerns 
about the medium-term sustainability of the current fiscal position. State 
revenue sources, particularly from tax and fees, have decreased, whilst 
spending on public services has increased and it needs to be continued to 
grow. Therefore, in order to ensure fiscal sustainability, concerted efforts to 
boost revenue mobilisation, restructuring and enhancement of efficiency in 
spending, and strengthening the management of public assets and liabilities, 
42 Thanh Nien Newspaper (2017), ‘PVFC’s inefficiency’, 18 March 2017, retrieved from https://
thanhnien.vn/thoi-su/tai-chinh-dau-khi-va-vung-lay-pvn-815718.html [accessed 23 June 2019].
43 VNExpress Newspaper (2017), ‘Vietnam reopens massive bank fraud trial’, 28 August 2017, 
retrieved from https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/51-bankers-businessmen-in-the-dock-as-
vietnam-reopens-massive-bank-fraud-trial-3633651.html [accessed 23 June 2019].
44 Tuoitre Newspaper	(2018),	‘PVN	suggests	the	bailouts	for	12	mass	projects’	(PVN	muốn	chi	
tiền	giải	cứu	các	đại	dự	án	thua	lỗ	ngàn	tỉ),	26	February	2018,	retrieved	from	https://tuoitre.
vn/pvn-muon-chi-tien-giai-cuu-cac-dai-du-an-thua-lo-ngan-ti-20180226180905857.htm 
[accessed 23 June 2019].
45 Nguyen, V.T et al. (n 11).
46 World Bank Group & Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Investment (2016), The 2035 
Vietnam Report: Toward Prosperity, Creativity, Equity, and Democracy, p. xxvi.
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and of fiscal risks are needed.47 The divestment in non-core business SOEs 
could be one of such mechanisms which may help to balance the State 
budget and raise funds for other infrastructure investments in the short term.
Given the above scenarios, the reform of state-owned businesses is 
necessary and irreversible. Accordingly, the PVN should focus on its core 
business activities, i.e. oil and gas exploration and production, gas industry, 
power industry, petroleum processing. In addition, it should accelerate the 
restructuring of its subsidiaries and affiliates in line with the 2016-2020 
development strategic plan.48 In tandem with the reform of the PVN, the 
market access initiatives in the petroleum sector should continue to open 
for non-state businesses through the specific incentives granted to investors 
in key energy projects that create the pressure on domestic rivals to upgrade 
the market competition, improve the quality of their goods and services, and 
enhance the consumer relations and marketing activities.49 Such initiatives 
ought to also take into account renewable energy investment and products 
as reliance on oil and gas does not offer the diversity and sustainable energy 
supply mix which Vietnam needs. 
2.2. An overview of the privatisation in petroleum sector
2.2.1. The new wave of energy SOEs equitisation
The main aim of a government in a socialist-oriented market economy 
is ascertained by maintaining the stronghold of SOEs power in many key 
sectors, and utilising such power to support the political goals.50 From this 
point of view, the Vietnamese government has classified all SOEs into three 
categories in the light of their political and economic roles and devised 
different ownership and control structures therein: 
The first group is comprised of enterprises that are strategically essential 
and should therefore be put under total State ownership and control. 
Particularly, according to the Official Document No. 1182/TTg-DMDN, 
the State determines to maintain the whole ownership of PVN – holding 
(parent) company, and keeps this enterprise under the form of a one-member 
limited liability company.
47 Tran, K.C. & Djalal, D. (2017), ‘The World Bank and Vietnam Work to Strengthen 
Fiscal Policies and Management Towards Sustainability, Efficiency, and Equity’, Press 
Release, 3 October 2017, retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2017/10/03/the-world-bank-and-vietnam-work-to-strengthen-fiscal-policies-and-
management-towards-sustainability-efficiency-and-equity [accessed 22 June 2019].
48 Ngoc Phuong (2017), ‘PetroVietnam: Focus on restructuring and boosting production’, 
PetroVietnam Journal vol. 6/2017, p.12, retrieved from http://www.pvn.vn/DataStore/
Documents/2017/Tapchi%20Dau%20khi/TCDK%2007%202017.pdf [accessed 22 June 
2019].
49 Tuoitre Newspaper (2017), ‘Vietnam’s fuel fight heats up as market welcomes first foreign player’, 
12 October 2017 2017, retrieved from https://tuoitrenews.vn/news/society/20171012/
vietnams-fuel-fight-heats-up-as-market-welcomes-first-foreign-player/42018.html [accessed 
22 June 2019].
50 Vu, T.T.A. (n 22), p.5.
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The second group includes SOEs for which the government wishes to 
retain significant control by holding the majority of shares; for example, over 
75 percent, from 65 to 75 percent, or from 50 to 65 percent of corporate 
capital after the partial divestment to private investors.51 There includes 
enterprises working on oil and gas exploitation and production, petroleum 
processing, wholesaling and distribution.52
The third group consists of the remaining SOEs which could be 
privatised under various means, such as issuing new shares, selling a fraction 
of existing shares held by the State, equitising enterprises to become 
corporations and selling off all State assets to employees, private shareholders 
and other stakeholders.53
Accordingly, the Decision No. 58/2016/QD-TTg dated 28 December 
2016 of the Prime Minister on criteria for classification of wholly SOEs, 
partially SOEs and list of SOEs undergoing restructuring in the 2016 - 
2020 period (Decision 58) specifies certain PVN’s subsidiaries are to have 
their State ownership reduced, including PetroVietnam Oil Corporation 
(PVOil), PetroVietnam Power Corporation (PVPower), Binh Son Refining 
and Petrochemical Company Limited, and Dung Quat Shipyard. It means 
that the majority of their shares shall be transferred to private sectors while 
the State will hold not more than 50 percent stake.
After the Decision 58 was issued, the first PVN unit launching an IPO 
was Binh Son Refining and Petrochemicals Company Limited (BSR) which 
operates Dung Quat Refinery with the book value on 31 December 2015 of 
over VND72 trillion (US$3.2 billion).54 In the approved plan, the 49 percent 
stake shall be publicly offered and PVN will only keep the remaining 43 
percent ownership.55 Prior to the IPO launching, the Decision No. 1725/
QD-TTg of the Prime Minister has deregulated the crucial subsidies on its 
petroleum products consumed domestically since 1 January 2017 whereby 
BSR shall no longer retain the import duties and has to fulfil its tax obligations 
like other enterprises. This means that BSR’s revenue would annually decrease 
by VND0.7 - 3.8 trillion (US$30.83 - 167.34 million) and its products would 
51 Appendix I – Criteria to classify SOEs, Enterprises having State’s capital attached to the 
Decision No. 58/2016/QD-TTg (2016).
52 Allen & Overy (2015), Publications: Vietnam lifts the cap on foreign ownership of public companies, 20 
July 2015, retrieved from http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Vietnam-
lifts-the-cap-on-foreign-ownership-of-public-companies.aspx [accessed 22 June 2019].
53 Le, T.A.N. (2015), State-owned Enterprise Reforms in the TPP Negotiation: Is it a win-win for 
Vietnam?, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E-092, p.7, retrieved from https://www.rieti.
go.jp/jp/publications/dp/15e092.pdf [accessed 22 June 2019].
54 The Decision No. 1938/QĐ-BCT of Ministry of Industry and Trade (2015).
55 BSR (2017),	“IPO	of	BSR”	(IPO	Lọc	hóa	dầu	Bình	Sơn:	Thị	trường	thêm	hàng	“khủng”),	
16 June 2017, retrieved from https://bsr.com.vn/vi/ipo-loc-hoa-dau-binh-son-thi-truong-
them-hang-khung.htm [accessed 22 June 2019].
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become uncompetitive on the local market. Moreover, the regulatory charge 
of 7% is imposed on the country’s first oil refinery to balance import tariffs on 
fuels and taxes on crude oil imported by the refinery.56
Surprisingly, without the fear of limited appeal in terms of its financial 
viability, the first batch of shares (nearly 250 million shares) were offered in 
January 2018 at the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE), equivalent to 
7.79 percent BSR’s stake, and subsequently, over VND5.5 trillion worth of 
shares were sold. Three weeks later, thousands of investors, both domestic 
and international, have registered to buy out, and the final amount of 
sold stake reached approximately 650 million shares, over 2.7 times of the 
volume offered.57 The next plan is to seek the strategic partners who could 
offset the shortcomings on plant operation and support for the upgrade 
and expansion of petrochemicals and deep-processing facilities, which are 
expected for commercial operations in 2021 in accordance with the Euro 
5 standard products. With respect to project financing, 30 percent of the 
capital (around US$1,269 million) was derived from funds gained by the 
equitisation and profits of 2018, and the remaining capital would be derived 
from loans. The longer it takes to secure the capital arrangements, the more 
the delay in achieving intended economic efficiency and quality. As Dung 
Quat Refinery’s petroleum products are classified as under Euro 2 Standard, 
they would not be qualified for domestic consumption which forces the 
plant to reduce its production or even stop its operation completely.58
The second entity to undergo an IPO is PetroVietnam Oil Corporation 
(PVOil), a unit of PVN which exclusively takes part in the development of 
the downstream activities, including crude oil import and export, trading 
and processing, storage and distribution. Over the last 30 years, PVOil has 
already sold around 300 million metric tonnes of crude oil produced in 
Vietnam and overseas, and supplied in exclusive crude oil feedstock to Dung 
Quat refinery at an average quantity of 7 million metric tonnes per year.59
The company is scheduled to sell up to 51 percent stake where the 
strategic shareholders are expected to account for 39 to 44 percent.60 As a 
56 SaigonTimes (2019), ‘Quang Ngai proposes solutions to Dung Quat refinery difficulties’, 27 
December 2017, retrieved from https://english.thesaigontimes.vn/57736/Quang-Ngai-
proposes-solutions-to-Dung-Quat-refinery-difficulties.html [accessed 22 June 2019].
57 BSR	(2018),	‘Successful	IPO	with	242	million	BSR’s	stakes	is	sold’	(IPO	thành	công	242	triệu	
cổ	phần	Lọc	hóa	dầu	Bình	Sơn),	17	January	2018,	retrieved	from	https://bsr.com.vn/en/ipo-
thanh-cong-242-trieu-co-phan-loc-hoa-dau-binh-son.htm [accessed 22 June 2019].
58 VietnamNews (2017), ‘Dung Quat oil refinery works on expansion project’, 24 July 2017, 
retrieved from http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/380693/dung-quat-oil-refinery-works-on-
expansion-project.html#P8MMZMq6ruDmGJJi.99 [accessed 22 June 2019].
59 PVOil (2019), Business Activities, retrieved from https://www.pvoil.com.vn/en-US/business-
activities [accessed 22 June 2019].
60 The Decision No. 1979/QD-TTg approving equitization plan of PetroVietnam Oil Corporation 
(2017), Art.4 and Art. 5.
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result, the IPO sale was opened in January 2018, where nearly 207 million 
shares with the value over VND2,770 billion – accounting for 20 percent of 
charter capital of the company have been acquired by a variety of investors. 
Beyond all expectations, the subsequent registered volume to buy was more 
than 483 million shares, 2.33 times of the volume offered to be exact. PVOil 
then applied to be listed in the stock exchange market (the Unlisted Public 
Company Market – UPCoM) under the relevant regulations.61
The third and the final company up for sale is the PetroVietnam Power 
Corporation (PVPower), the country’s second-largest electricity producer 
after Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), with 12 percent of market share. 
According to the final structure approved by the government, the State will 
retain a 51 percent stake, and offer 28.9 percent to strategic investors and 
another 20 percent in the public equity market.62 At the ceremony held in 
Hanoi Stock Exchange, this was hailed as the biggest deal on traded value, 
about VND7 trillion (US$308.1 million), with the participation of nearly 
2,000 purchasers (97 institutional investors and nearly 1,900 individuals).63
In sum, there are three success stories in relation to the equitisation of 
Vietnam’s SOEs within the first quarter of the strategic schedule of 2018 – 
2020. It could be expected that the progress of equitisation of energy SOEs 
will continue, with the future deals of PVGas, which has generated over 30 
percent of PVN’s annual profits,64 and a dozen of other PVN’s subsidiaries 
are expected to be offered for sale.65
2.2.2. Increasing the engagement of foreign investment in energy projects
Apart from participating in exploration and production projects over 
the years, foreign investment is paying attention to development on key 
downstream facilities. By upgrading the refinery capacity, Vietnam has not 
only ensured the sufficient and clean fuel supply for domestic consumption 
and minimising dependence on imported energy supplies, but also has 
been able to export petrochemical products.66 Due to the lack of financial 
61 Vietnam Investment Review (2018), ‘PV Oil collects $190 million from IPO’, 30 January 2018, 
retrieved from https://www.vir.com.vn/pv-oil-collects-190-million-from-ipo-56010.html 
[accessed 22 June 2019].
62 The Decision No. 1977/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister approving equitization plan of PetroVietnam 
Power Corporation (2017).
63 VietnamNews (2018), ‘PV Power raises $311 million from IPO’, 1 February 2018, retrieved 
from http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/422255/pv-power-raises-311-million-from-ipo.
html#f4gj3ycX7kvpZmae.97 [accessed 22 June 2019].
64 Vietnam News (2018), ‘Government focuses on divestment in oil and gas sector’, 26 February 2018, 
retrieved from https://vietnamnews.vn/economy/business-beat/423334/government-focuses-
on-divestment-in-oil-and-gas-sector.html#yVcL5iRfAyKVJU9w.97 [accessed 22 June 2019].
65 Decision No. 1232/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister Minister giving approval for list of SOEs undergoing 
divestment in the 2017-2020 period (2017).
66 Searle, S. & Malins, C. (2016), Case study: refineries in Vietnam, The International Council on 
Clean Transportation (ICCT) Working Paper, vol. 2016-3, p.1.
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resources and technology know-how domestically, the positive role of FDI 
has been successfully demonstrated through three key projects in the refinery 
and petrochemical sectors.
Dung Quat refinery – the first oil refinery in Vietnam – has been in 
operation since 2009, with the capacity of over 6.5 million tonnes of products 
per annum (mainly from diesel and gasoline that meet Euro 2 standards).67 
During the project implementation, the joint venture between Vietnam 
and Russian partner (Vietnamese Russian Joint Venture Vietross Refinery) 
was dissolved because of the unreasonable capital structure (50/50) and the 
inefficient decision-making procedures, combined with the lack of experience 
on refinery and incompetent human resources.68
The adverse consequence was that the increased cost from initial 
US$1.3 - 2.5 billion, nearly double of the budget approved by the National 
Assembly in 1997. Five out of six main work packages of the project fell 
behind the proposed schedule for at least six months. In August 2009, 
PetroVietnam temporarily halted its operations because of a broken valve in 
a fluid catalytic cracker for petrol products. Technip was chosen to fix the 
problem and to hand over the new refinery technology to PetroVietnam 
in May 2010. The refinery processed 4 million tonnes of crude oil and 
produced 3 million tonnes of petroleum products such as gasoline, diesel and 
fuel oil. An expansion project to increase its capacity to 10 million tonnes is 
being undertaken, which requires an investment of US$1-2 billion.69
The second refinery, Nghi Son Integrated Refinery and Petrochemical 
(NSRP), was built in July 2013 and has been operated commercially since 
February 2018. NSRP is sponsored by four corporations: PVN, Kuwait 
Petroleum Europe B.V. (KPE) from Kuwait, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. and 
Mitsui Chemical, Inc. from Japan. This plant is the largest-ever FDI in Vietnam 
to date and therefore the success of this project is the key to attract further 
foreign investments into Vietnam, especially FDI from Japan and Kuwait.70
In February 2018, the construction of Long Son Petrochemicals (LSP), 
the third and a mega-petrochemical refinery complex, has been launched. 
This project is strategically important for Vietnam in order to meet the 
growing domestic demand for refined and petrochemical products driven 
by rapid industrialisation and modernisation of the country. After several 
67 Ibid.
68 VNExpress Newspaper (2002), ‘The withdrawal of Russian partner in Dung Quat Refinery’, 
20 November 2002, retrieved from https://vnexpress.net/kinh-doanh/doi-tac-nga-rut-khoi-
lien-doanh-loc-dau-dung-quat-2671022.html [accessed 22 June 2019].
69 HydroCarbons Technology, Dung Quat, Oil Refinery No.1 https://www.hydrocarbons-
technology.com/projects/dung/ accessed 22 June 2019.
70 NSRP (2019), ‘Overview’, retrieved from http://nsrp.vn/the-project/2_overview [accessed 
22 June 2019].
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adjustments on shareholder and capital structures, the project might be 
wholly owned by the Thai industrial conglomerate Siam Cement Group 
(SCG), after the successful acquisition of PVN’s assets.71
In short, there are two remarkable milestones during the privatisation in 
petroleum sector. Firstly, the SOEs divestment has been firmly accelerated 
by a strong will from the government. In return, the positive reception 
of domestic and foreign investors towards the IPO deals has shown the 
attractiveness of energy enterprises due to high expectation on business 
rewards and other interests.72 Secondly, the Vietnamese government has 
signed international treaties73 and enacted domestic legal instruments74 to 
honour and safeguard its obligations therein. These commitments have had a 
direct impact on the increased participation of foreign partners in key energy 
projects. In addition, they have led to the realisation that regulatory reforms 
are urgently needed to incentivise investment by international stakeholders 
and more importantly put in place a legal framework to ensure fair and 
equitable treatment of non-State entities operating in the energy sector.
In the next section, critical assessment of the impact on such privatisation 
on market competition and corporate performance is provided. In doing so, 
particular reference is made to petro retail market access which is granted to 
foreign entities.
3. Impact of equitisation on completion: An initial assessment
According to a study implemented by the Vietnam Petroleum Institute,
the petrol demand in 2017 was over 19.3 million tonnes while the maximum 
annual capacity of the Dung Quat refinery – the only in-operation refinery 
in Vietnam at the time – was around 6.5 million tonnes, satisfying only a 
one-third of the market demand. The remaining portion had to be fulfilled 
by import, mainly from ASEAN countries and Korea. The quantity of 
71 Tuoitre Newspaper (2018),	‘Thailand	partner	offers	to	acquire	the	whole	LSP’	(Đại	gia	Thái	muốn	
mua	trọn	Hóa	dầu	Long	Sơn	5,4	tỉ	US$),	22	January	2018,	retrieved	from	https://tuoitre.vn/dai-
gia-thai-muon-mua-tron-hoa-dau-long-son-5-4-ti-US$-20180122113955208.htm [accessed 22 
June 2019].
72 Reuteur (n 16).
73 The CPTPP and VN-EU FTA also have the provisions to protect the legal rights and interest 
of foreign investors. For example, the draft of VN-EU FTA, Section III: SOEs, Art.4 – Non-
discrimination and commercial considerations: “1. Each Party shall ensure that its state-owned enterprises, 
designated monopolies and enterprises granted special rights or privileges, when engaging in commercial activities,: 
(…) b) accord to enterprises of the other Party, enterprises that are investments of investors of the other Party, 
goods of the other Party, and services of the other Party, treatment no less favourable than they accord to, 
respectively, enterprises of the Party which are in like situations, like goods of the Party, and like services of the 
Party, with respect to their purchases or sales of goods or services in the relevant market.”
74 The Law on Competition (2004), Art.2 – Applicable entities: “This Law shall apply to: 1. 
Organizations and individuals conducting business (hereinafter together referred to as enterprises), including 
enterprises engaged in production or supply of public utility products or services, enterprises conducting 
business in State monopoly industries and sectors and overseas enterprises operating in Vietnam.”
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imported petrol reached nearly 9 million tonnes in 2017 with the cost of 
US$4.5 billion. In comparison with the same quarter in 2016, there was a 
10 percent increase in quantity, and 40 percent in value.75
Against this background, the government has emphasised the 
development of domestic refineries in order to achieve the goals of national 
energy security and adequate and high-quality supply for economic growth.76 
The construction of the second and the third refinery and petrochemicals 
plants demonstrates determination of the State to achieve such goals set forth 
in the National Energy Development Strategy, inter alia increasing the annual 
domestic capacity up to 25–30 million tonnes of petroleum products.77 Nghi 
Son Integrated Refinery and Petrochemical which is “in-production” status, 
with the first batch of 5,000 tonnes of petrol in May 2018, is an optimistic 
signal; however, the needed productivity is far away in the short term.78
In its eagerness to attract investment, Vietnam has committed to several 
exceptional incentives, i.e. guarantee in the wholesale price of products from 
the plant, special tax reliefs and maintaining the duties applicable to imported 
petroleum products not less than 7 percent until 2028.79 Moreover, the foreign 
sponsors have been permitted to access in the petrol retail market which 
mainly aims to be distribution system of products manufactured by the plant.80
As a result, Idemitsu Q8 Petroleum owned by the consortium of 
Idemitsu Kosan and Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI) was established 
in April 2016 which launched the first filling station in Thang Long 
Industrial Park, Hanoi in October 2017. This event was an awakening for 
its Vietnamese rivals with a clear message: “step up your game, or step out of the 
game” when the new foreign-owned entity committed to bring Japanese-
quality service to the local market, by the guarantee of less than a 0.01-liter 
margin of error. Such event has been embraced by both the public and 
industry experts who have been long waiting for a positive change in this 
highly protective sector.81
75 Forbes Vietnam (2017), ‘A FDI enterprise in petrol retail and distribution’, 8 October 2017, 
retrieved from http://forbesvietnam.com.vn/tin-cap-nhat/thi-truong-ban-le-xang-dau-viet-
nam-xuat-hien-doanh-nghiep-ngoai-1372.html [accessed 22 June 2019].
76 Cong Thuong Newspaper (2017) (n 24).
77 Decision No.1855/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on Approving Vietnam’s National Energy Development 
Strategy up to 2020, with the outlook to 2050 (2007), Art.1.2, subs.b—Specific Objectives, para.4.
78 Thanh Nien Newspaper (2018), ‘NSRP sold out the first batch of 5,000 m3 of RON 92 gasoline’, 
1 May 2018, retrieved from https://thanhnien.vn/tai-chinh-kinh-doanh/nha-may-loc-hoa-dau-
nghi-son-xuat-5000-m3-xang-ron-92-dau-tien-958300.html [accessed 22 June 2019].
79 Dan Tri Newspaper (2017), ‘Wrongful negotiation in Nghi Son Refinery – How compensating 
the loss?’, 16 May 2017, retrieved from http://dantri.com.vn/kinh-doanh/dam-phan-ho-loc-
dau-nghi-son-lay-tien-dau-de-bu-lo-20170516155004755.htm [accessed 22 June 2019].
80 Forbes Vietnam (n 74)
81 Tuoitre Newspaper (2017), ‘Vietnam’s fuel fight heats up as market welcomes first foreign player’, 
12 October 2017,. retrieved from https://tuoitrenews.vn/news/society/20171012/vietnams-fuel-
fight-heats-up-as-market-welcomes-first-foreign-player/42018.html [accessed 22 June 2019] 
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Although the appearance of a foreign competitor in petrol retail 
market was an interesting and a novel phenomenon for most, an overhaul 
of Vietnam’s fuel policies is needed to change in competitiveness in this 
market. Firstly, the fully foreign-owned enterprise, Idemitsu Q8 Petroleum, 
is obliged to comply with  regulations as the same as the domestic businesses. 
Particularly, the Decree No. 83/2014/ND-CP dated 3 September 2014 
of Government (“Decree 83”) provided the conditions applicable to all of 
petrol distribution units. Given that the petrol distribution is a conditional 
business line, prior to being granted the required license, the business entity 
has to fully satisfy the conditional precedents set forth in such regulations. For 
example, each distributor has to own or rent  products import-export ports 
which are able for the access of minimum 7,000-tonne vessels,82 storage,83 
outlet facilities,84 etc. Those requirements, even which could be justified 
on the ground of ensuring the products quality, protecting the consumers’ 
interest, and other health-safety-environment issues, are significant barriers 
for market access for prospective businesses.85
While the Decree No. 08/2018/ND-CP (“Decree 08”) which partly 
amended some of articles of the Decree 83 may be seen as an expression of 
government’s efforts to facilitate market access and competition, the petrol 
retail market remains to be a highly restricted market for foreign investors 
and businesses. Additionally, it is worth noting that while Vietnam has 
conferred exceptional privileges for numerous foreign companies in key 
energy projects that have importance for its national energy security interests, 
it is unlikely that Vietnam will open its petrol retail market to foreign entities 
pursuant to international arrangements, such as WTO,86 EVFTA, CPTPP.87
Secondly, the price of petrol and gasoline is intervened by the 
administrative decisions directly where the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade jointly adjust the ceiling prices for the 
available products nationally. Even though the retailers are permitted to offer 
the price below the maximum, petroleum companies in Vietnam typically 
set their prices to match the ceiling. This is obviously a vicious circle. The 
strict regulations over gasoline prices force the businesses to fight for market 
share by increasing the discount to outlets, rather than offering competitive 
82 The Decree 83, Art.7(2).
83 Ibid. Art.7(3).
84 Ibid., Art.7(4).
85 Tuoitre Newspaper (n 80). 
86 Based on Vietnam’s commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO), “crude oil and 
petroleum products” are one of the 7 conditional business lines for which Vietnam is not obliged 
to open the market for foreign investors.
87 CafeF Newspaper (2017), ‘The participation of Idemitsu Q8 Petroleum is the good signal for 
market’, 7 October 2017, retrieved from http://cafef.vn/pho-tong-giam-doc-petrolimex-su-
tham-gia-cua-idemitsu-la-tin-hieu-tot-cho-thi-truong-nhung-chung-toi-da-chuan-bi-tu-
hang-chuc-nam-truoc-20171007005930684.chn [accessed 22 June 22, 2019].
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prices to customers. In turn, costs for businesses increase and prevent them 
from lowering retail prices. Furthermore, petroleum businesses are legally 
responsible for maintaining a fixed profit margin of VND300 per litre, 
which is already accounted for in the price customers pay at the pump. 
This not only guarantees that companies always remain profitable, but also 
narrows the room for competition among businesses.88
In this context, the controversial debate revolves around whether the 
State should deregulate provisions to set the ceiling prices of petrol products. 
On the one hand, those in favour of the deregulation policy put forward 
a persuasive argument whereby if a business could optimize the prices than 
those of its competitors, e.g. importing the lower price sources, it should be 
allowed to sell at more competitive prices. In other words, the State should let 
gasoline prices to be determined under the market rules and conditions, rather 
than the bureaucratic administrative intervention. Only then will there be the 
true competition among players, which will ultimately benefit to consumers.89
The opponents on the other hand come with a warning that any 
move towards deregulation should come with a caution in order to prevent 
foreign companies from manipulating Vietnam’s fuel market. However, this 
opinion is flawed as the Institute for Pricing Research has shown that it 
is unlikely that the competition would result in “cutting-throat” business 
tactics. When foreigners enter the market, they can compete with local 
companies by relying on advanced management, effective retail system, and 
a diverse range of products. However, when it comes to gasoline, there 
is only a limited number of products that make it difficult to push the 
competitors out of the market.90
Thirdly, when one considers the market structure prior to the 
establishment of Idemitsu Q8, it can be seen that there were 31 domestic 
licensed importers and wholesalers, and around 120 retailers who controlled 
over 14,000 gas stations nationwide. Among others, Petrolimex can be 
deemed as the dominant undertaking/company,91 with the largest market 
share of nearly 50 percent followed by PVOil which enjoys over 20 percent 
market share. The remaining portion is shared by smaller competitors, 
such as Saigon Petro, Mipec Petro, Thalexim.92 There is apparently 
88 Tuoitre News (n 80).
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 The Law on Competition (2004), Art.11 - Enterprises and groups of enterprises in dominant market 
position: “1. An enterprise shall be deemed to be in a dominant market position if such enterprise has a market 
share of thirty (30) percent or more in the relevant market or is capable of substantially restraining competition.”
92 Cafebiz Newspaper	(2017),	‘Competition	between	Petrolimex	and	PVOil’	(So	găng	Petrolimex	và	
PV	Oil:	Hai	đại	gia	ngành	xăng	dầu	chuẩn	bị	ra	mắt	thị	trường	chứng	khoán),	29	March	2017,	
retrieved from http://cafebiz.vn/so-gang-petrolimex-va-pv-oil-hai-dai-gia-nganh-xang-dau-
chuan-bi-ra-mat-thi-truong-chung-khoan-20170329095123871.chn [accessed 22 June 2019].
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a oligopolistic market93 dominated by a small number of suppliers that 
requires each company to take into account its rivals’ actions and potential 
subsequent responses to its actions.94 The dilemma of distributors to keep 
the prices to match the ceiling amount or decrease them to compete with 
others is the current status of petrol retail market in Vietnam.
In practice, detecting a sub-competitive performance in oligopolistic 
market can be challenging, and the manner in which such phenomenon 
occurs, e.g. an explicit agreement among firms to restrain the competition, 
may be frustratingly difficult to investigate and remedy under competition 
and/or anti-trust law.95 For example, in the case of anti-competitive behaviour 
of Vinapco, the exclusive supplier for jet fuel had entered into a purchase 
agreement with Pacific Airlines (PA) to supply fuel for PA’s planes, with the 
fuel price had been determined herein.96 Three months after the agreement, 
Vinapco invited PA to re-negotiate the new price. Although PA agreed that the 
increase of fuel price might be reasonable when taking into account the recent 
circumstance, it stressed that such increase has to be equal among domestic 
airline enterprises, particular PA and Vietnam Airlines (VNA). Because of the 
discriminative pricing imposed to it, PA complained in writing to Vinapco 
and sent the claim to the Vietnamese Competition Council.97
The ad-hoc Council considered jet fuel supply service in terms of 
supplying gasoline for civil aviation which is different than the service for 
other purposes, such as for military or household consumption. Thus, based 
on the characteristics and utility purposes of goods or services, the relevant 
market was determined and as such Vinapco occupied a dominant position 
therein. Consequently, Vinapco’s behaviour was prohibited under Articles 
13(4), 14(2) and 14(3) of the 2004 Competition Law which prohibits the 
abuse of market dominant position to damage the consumers’ interest. 
Therefore, the fine of VND3.4 billion, combined with the legal fees, 
was issued against Vinapco. Vinapco appealed the decision however, the 
93 “The primary idea behind an oligopolistic market (an oligopoly) is that few companies rule over many 
in a particular market or industry, offering similar goods and services. Because of a limited number of 
players in an oligopolistic market, competition is limited, allowing every firm to operate successfully.” See, 
Corporate Finance Institute, ‘What is an Oligopolistic Market or Oligopoly?’, retrieved from 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/oligopolistic-market-
oligopoly/ [accessed 21 June 2019].
94 Committee on Competition Law and Policy (1999), ‘Oligopoly’, Policy Roundtables DAFFE/
CLP(99)25, OECD, p.18, retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/1920526.pdf 
[accessed 22 June 2019].
95 OECD (2019), Oligopoly markets, retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/
oligopoly-markets.htm [accessed 22 June 2019].
96 The Purchase Agreement No. JET A-1 No. 34/PA2008 (2007).
97 Vietnam Competition Council (VCC) (2019), Case of abuse of market dominance, retrieved 
from http://www.hoidongcanhtranh.gov.vn/default.aspx?page=news&do=detail&category_
id=1&id=97 [accessed 22 June 2019].
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Supreme Court (Chamber of Appeal) upheld the initial judgment.98
Despite of this exemplary case, which reveals the genuine willingness 
of the authorities to counter anti-competitive practices, the competition 
among petrol distributors continues to be suspicious, particularly in 
the oligopolistic market with the strong protection and administrative 
intervention from the State.
Moreover, private sector participation in the SOEs equitisation is a 
motivation for fostering the needs of corporate transparency and efficiency. 
In the current status of petrol retail market, there is currently merely a race 
between two giants, namely Petrolimex and PVOil (PVN’s subsidiary). 
The former was established in 1956, with core business is comprised 
of petrol import-export and production. Besides trading petroleum 
products, Petrolimex also provides other goods and services, such as 
telecommunications, civil engineering consultancy, transport, real estate and 
car repair, invests in insurance companies and commercial banks (e.g. holding 
40 percent of stake in PG Bank). It owns the largest petrol distribution 
system, around 2,400 outlets which occupy 44 percent of the domestic oil 
market, with over 50 percent being directly sold to consumers, around 20 
percent directly sold to industrial customers.99 The State, by proceeding with 
the plan of 2016-2020 SOEs equitisation, has sold 8 percent of Petrolimex 
stake to JX Nippon Oil & Energy (JX NOE) following nearly two years of 
negotiations, with the deal value around JP¥ 20 billion (US$183 million out 
of Petrolimex’s valuation at US$1.77 billion). It is expected that this firm 
could optimise its operation system, including the management of the petrol 
station network and payment method.100
The latter company, PVOil, was formed by the merger of Petroleum 
Trading Corporation (Petechim) and Petroleum Products Processing and 
Distribution Company (PDC) in 2008 and is the sole unit of PVN in charge 
of crude oil import-export, trading and processing, condensate and bio-fuel 
production.101In spite of being a new comer to the energy retail market, it 
has been eager to expand its market share, set a chain of outlets and acquire 
smaller rival companies. Consequently, its distribution system has increased to 
approximately 540 filling stations, amounting to over 20 percent of the market 
98 Decision No. 11/QD-HDXL of Vietnam Competition Council regarding Vietnam Air Petrol One Member 
Co., Ltd. stopped supplying gasoline for Jetstar Pacific Airlines (2009).
99 Vietnam Investment Review (2017), ‘Foreign investors gunning for petroleum retail market’, 13 
July 2017, retrieved from http://www.vir.com.vn/foreign-investors-gunning-for-petroleum-
retail-market-50575.html [accessed 22 June 2019].
100 The Voice of Vietnam (VOV) (2016), ‘Why do Japanese want a stake in Petrolimex?’, 13 
March 2016, retrieved from http://english.vov.vn/trade/why-do-japanese-want-a-stake-in-
petrolimex-314531.vov [accessed 22 June 2019].
101 Decision No. 1250/QD-DKVN of PVN Board of Directors (2008).
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share within a few years of being in operation.102 With the monies gained 
from the equitisation, PVOil has been enthusiastic to upgrade its market share 
given that its biggest rival shall be restricted under the current competition 
law provisions. In relation to the prohibited cases of economic concentration, 
Article 14 of the Vietnamese Competition Law 2014 states that:
“Any economic concentration shall be prohibited if the enterprises participating 
in the economic concentration have a combined market share in the relevant market 
of more than fifty (50) percent, except in the cases stipulated in article 19 of this 
Law or where the enterprise after the economic concentration still falls within the 
category of medium and small sized enterprises as stipulated by law.”
With the legal protection behind it, pursuant to its ambitious strategy 
for 2018 – 2022, PVOil plans to open 1,050 filling stations to increase the 
market share from 22 to 35 percent.103
Besides its strategy for expansion domestically, PVOil has sent offers 
to potential international investors, such as Shell, Idemitsu Kosan Co., 
Ltd, Kuwait Petroleum International (KPI), Puma (Swiss), SK (Korea), 
to sell its major stake, and reduce the State’s ownership to 49 percent.104 
However, such offers come with many conditions attached, including the 
guarantee of financial capacity, the experience in petroleum field globally, 
the commitment to hold the stake for at least 10 years, advanced technology 
transfer as well as honouring the obligation to purchase all Dung Quat 
refinery’s petrol products.105 These preconditions are likely to reduce the 
attractiveness investment in PVOil by its foreign strategic partners.
Apart from boosting competition, the SOEs equitisation has urged the 
improvement of corporate governance practices, i.e. the transparency and 
economic-driven consideration in decision making. Information disclosure 
is one of the most important requirements in business processes however, 
availability and access legal and business information (e.g. company accounts 
and performance) stills remain as a major obstacle for foreign investors.106 For 
example, Vietnamese law (Decree No. 81/2015/ND-CP) requires that by 
the 31 May, PVOil shall publish its 6-monthly report for the previous year, 
102 PVOil, ‘Retail system’, retrieved from https://www.pvoil.com.vn/mang-luoi/he-thong-cua-
hang-xang-dau [accessed 22 June 2019].
103 CafeF Newspaper, ‘PVOIl will take 35 percent of petrol retail market share?’,12 January 2018, 
retrieved from http://cafef.vn/pv-oil-lay-nong-thon-vay-thanh-thi-de-lay-35-thi-phan-ban-
le-xang-dau-20180111174434895.chn [accessed 22 June 2019].
104 Ibid.
105 PVOil (2018), ‘Announcement: PVOil’s delay for selecting strategic investors’, 28 June 2018, retrieved 
from https://www.pvoil.com.vn/thong-bao-pvoil-tam-hoan-qua-trinh-lua-chon-nha-dau-tu-chien-
luoc [accessed 22 June 2019].
106 Customs Newspaper (2017), ‘Equitization of state-owned enterprises: Narrow door for foreign strategic 
investors’, 21 November 2017, retrieved from http://customsnews.vn/equitization-of-state-owned-
enterprises-narrow-door-for-foreign-strategic-investors-5202.html [accessed 22 June 2019].
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and by the 15th of August, it is supposed to publish the 6-monthly report.107 
However, PVOil rarely publishes its reports on time on the national portal 
http://business.gov.vn/ for public’s perusal.
In contrast to the international practices which require large mergers 
and acquisitions deals to be subjected to due diligence and risk assessment, 
very few Vietnamese SOEs are aware of the importance of careful and 
detailed appraisal in the search for strategic shareholders. For instance, the 
criteria for selecting the strategic shareholders are not published publicly, 
or such documents are not written in English which makes it difficult for 
international investors to engage in such processes.108
In addition, there have been queries pertaining to how the procurement 
of SOE projects are conducted and if there are practices to hide collusions 
between project owners and contractors.109 Following the Bidding Journal’s 
statistics, since 2009 PVOil had issued invitations to bid of 139 packages 
whereas the published result of selecting competent contractors was only 20 
which contradicts the provisions of annual report of the projects financed by 
the State budget.110 Furthermore, there is evidence in number of instances 
that the prices quoted by contractors were coincidentally matched to the 
estimated project budget. For example, in the package of software licensing 
for 2016 – 2020, the quotation of CMC System Integrated Saigon was 
VND36.3 billion, compared to the pre-estimated budget of VND37.3 
billion. In another case involving E5/E10 fuel blending system in Can Tho 
storage, Tan Long Technical Solutions was awarded, with the VND2.95-
billion bid as similar to the budget estimation.111
PVOil had also opted for ‘negotiated bidding’ which is applicable for 
some critical packages. For instance, PVC-MS (a subsidiary of PetroVietnam 
Construction Corp.) was selected to execute the package of constructing Nha 
Be Oil Storage, with the agreed amount of VND138.1 billion, compared to the 
approved budget of VND138.7 billion. Another case was the transportation of 
petrol products from Dung Quat Refinery to PVOil’s storage system, the price 
of bid was VND218.8 billion while the estimated figure was around VND220 
107 Decree No. 81/2015/ND-CP of Government on publishing of SOE’ information (2015), Art.18 – 
Publishing of corporate financial information.
108 Customs Newspaper (n 105).
109 The collusion in bidding is prohibited by the 2005 Law on Competition, Art.8.8: “Agreements in 
restraint of competition shall comprise collusion in order for one or more parties to win a tender for supply of goods 
and services” and Art.9.1: “The agreements stipulated in clauses 8 of Article 8 of this Law shall be prohibited.”
Also, the Bidding Law 2005 also stated in Art.12.3 “Prohibited acts in bidding include collusion or 
connivance between bid solicitors and contractors, between state management agencies, bid solicitors and contractors 
to alter bids or collusion with appraising or inspecting agencies, which affects the collective or national interests.”
110 Circular No. 06/2017/TT-BKHDT of The Ministry of Planning and Investment (2017), Art.6 & 
Art.7
111 Bidding Journal (2017), ‘Lack of transparency in PVOil’s bids’, 21 March 2017, retrieved from 
http://baodauthau.vn/tai-chinh/mu-mit-thong-tin-nhu-pv-oil-36029.html [accessed 22 
June 2019].
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billion.112 These facts reveal that such bidding processes and practices could not 
adhere to the principles of competition, fairness and transparency, safeguard 
the objectives of the project and failed to enhance the competitiveness and 
effectiveness of subsequent project implementation.113
When becoming a listed public company, investors expect that PVOil has 
to conduct its business with diligence, under the supervision of shareholders 
and other institutional bodies, in accordance with the law on enterprises,114 
and law on securities.115 In the next section, some major recommendations 
would be drawn to enhance the merits of privatisation in energy SOEs as well 
as to ensure the benefits to the stakeholders.
4. Challenges and recommendations
While progress has been made and ambitious new targets have been set,
a number of barriers still exist for unleashing the full benefits of SOE reform. 
Firstly, many remaining SOEs are very large yet they achieved limited 
progress on resolving their complex ownership and management structures. 
Similarly, there has been limited progress in clarifying their financial and 
debt obligations. These shortcomings, coupled with the challenges related 
to SOE transparency and corporate governance, have made it more difficult 
to find strategic investors willing to participate in their IPOs.116
Secondly, the reform plan shall be continuously pursued with a view 
of selling the minority non-controlling stakes in these companies while the 
government still remains as the largest shareholder. The lesson learnt from the 
third wave of equitisation by the end of 2011 was that in spite of more than 20 
years of reform and the equitisation of thousands of SOEs, only an estimated 
30 percent of state ownership in corporate entities had been transferred to 
private sectors, and the government retained an average ownership stake of 
57 percent in these firms. By only retaining minority control and decision-
making authority, private sector strategic partners have had a limited ability 
and power to reshape these companies into globally competitive enterprises.117
Thirdly, while state ownership has shrunk in commercial sectors of the 
economy, government plans have continued to emphasize the importance 
112 Ibid.
113 Vietnam Competition Agency (2014), Report: Review of Competition related regulations in sectoral 
regulatory laws, p.59.
114 The Law on Enterprises No. 68/2014/QH13 (2014), Art.171 - Information Publishing of 
Public Company)
115 The Law on Securities (consolidated version No. 27/VBHN-VPQH) (2018), Art.101 - Information 
Publishing of Public Company.
116 Asian Development Bank (2015), State-Owned Enterprise Reform in Vietnam: Lessons Learnt and Future 
Directions, Vietnam Public Finance Partnership Group High Level Meeting’s background paper 
(July 2015), pp.3-4, retrieved from http://www.mof.gov.vn/webcenter/ShowProperty?nodeId=/
UCM56/MOF149448//idcPrimaryFile&revision=latestreleased&rid=1 [accessed 22 June 2019].
117 Ibid., p.4.
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of retaining control over many “strategic sectors” which are prone to natural 
monopolies and oligopolies, so in many cases a continued government role 
may be necessary. However, while SOEs have been partially equitised, the 
strict commercial terms with management independence, profit orientation, 
hard budget constraints, and accountability for KPIs and results could 
enhance the corporate performance. These characteristics are essential for 
improvement of  SOEs performance as they force SOEs to meet their 
costs of capital and divest any activities that are not commercially viable. 
More importantly, improving SOEs performance in these sectors will 
rely not just on partial equitisation but on overhauling the government’s 
competition policies, regulatory oversight and corporate governance 
standards in order to lift accountability for results. Unfortunately, what 
one can observe is that progress on this front has been slow.118
With reference to the subject matter above, the question of what 
the relationship between privatisation process (including opening market 
for non-State sectors, and divestment of SOEs) and competition policy to 
enhance the economic efficiency in the current Vietnam government’s 
policy mix remains to be answered. In the Vietnamese context, it is clear 
that the nature of this relationship will mostly depend on the government’s 
ultimate objective and choice. A rent-seeking government that wants to 
extract rent from businesses chooses not to privatise profitable SOEs and, 
moreover, promotes institutional arrangements that put excessive costs on 
private firms. In contrast, a market-friendly government chooses to privatise 
all profitable SOEs completely. Finally, if the government is benevolent 
and cares about the well-being of consumers, a competition policy aimed 
at levelling the playing field among businesses regardless their ownership 
origins ought to be put in place.119
In a paper prepared for the Vietnam Public Finance Partnership Group 
High Level Meeting which based on the experiences of Vietnam over three 
decades, it was shown that SOE reform is often a contentious, complex task; 
the process entails multiple reforms to laws, institutions of government, fiscal 
and regulatory policies, and also case-by-case enterprise restructuring.120 
A number of important lessons derived from the experiences of both the 
government and institutional partners for swift progress can be grouped into 
two broad priority areas:
The first priority is the need to increase the pace and the depth of 
equitisation of SOEs engaged in commercial activities. Indeed, there remains 
a significant amount of SOEs doing business in unessential sectors where 
118 Ibid.
119 Vu, T.T.A. (n 22)
120 ADB (n 115), p.6
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private competition would lead to more efficient production. Subsequently, 
these could create serious distortions in Vietnam’s economy, acting as a 
drag on economic growth and employment creation. Therefore, reducing 
State ownership and allowing fully commercial, market-driven companies 
to emerge should be the central priority of SOEs equitisation. Besides, 
removing government ownership and control of these entities would cause 
significant productivity, this goal could be supported by strengthening the 
legal environment for SOEs.121
With an array of legislative reforms being implemented over the last two 
decades to address specific legal inadequacies, the frequency and diversity of 
legal revisions have contributed to a proliferation of new laws, decrees and 
guidelines. For example, the National Assembly has enacted a number of 
legal instruments relating to enterprises, such as the 2014 Enterprise Law,122 
the 2014 Investment Law,123 the 2017 Law on Management and Use of State 
Assets.124 These contain important provisions, which serve as the foundation 
for the commercial markets and trade in general as well as the regulations 
of SOEs operations in order to meet the State regulatory requirements on 
enterprises, while improving the efficiency and competitiveness of businesses 
in their production, operations and restructuring.
In order to improve the legal system in support of the acceleration 
the SOE restructuring process, the Prime Minister have issued regulations 
and policies, including the Decree No. 81/2015/ND-CP on publishing 
SOE information which mandates the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
(MPI) to announce the list of enterprises violating such requirements via the 
portal http://business.gov.vn/, the Decision No. 35/2013/QD-TTg on 
Rules of Independent Auditors in SOEs owning 100 percent State capital, 
the Decision No. 58/2016/QD-TTg classifying three SOEs categories and 
the list of restructured SOEs in the 2016 – 2020  period can also be added 
to the list of positive legislative initiatives undertaken by the Prime Minister.
Inadvertently, adherence to the SOE regulations has become 
increasingly complex which in turn may be hindering SOEs efforts to 
reform themselves as well as the private sectors ability to understand, and 
participate in prospective SOE equitisation. As a result, consolidation of 
the various legal instruments such as decrees, decisions, and resolutions that 
currently regulate SOEs and the equitisation procedures, and repealing any 
conflicting rules needs to be undertaken without a delay.125
121 Ibid.
122 The Law on Enterprises No. 68/2014/QH13 (2014).
123 The Law on Investment No. 67/2014/QH13 (2014).
124 The 2017 Law on Management and Use of State Assets No. 15/2017/QH14 (2017) which 
repealed the Law on Management and Use of State Assets No. 09/2008/QH12 (2008).
125 ADB (n 115), p.6.
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In addition to fine-tuning the legal system, the government has 
endeavoured to build the specific institutions aimed to strengthen the 
unified management mechanism over SOEs and the coordination among 
its authorities. One of such efforts was the establishment of the National 
Steering Committee for SOE reform and development under the Prime 
Minister’s Decision No. 2092/QD-TTg.126 The Committee is a part of the 
Cabinet Government, chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister and consists of 
senior officials from relevant ministries and government agencies.127
However, the efficiency of this mechanism is questionable because 
in some cases, the Committee has not been able to fully resolve the 
fragmentation of responsibility that currently exists in SOE reform process. 
Particularly, different ministries have drafted their own SOE-related 
regulations, with limited or no consultation with other relevant agencies.128 
Moreover, the decision-making process is time consuming, requiring at 
least 12 procedural steps and taking an average of 17 months. Therefore, the 
role of this Committee needs to be re-considered or it needs to be supported 
by competent governmental departments, in order to ensure an oversight of 
the inter-ministerial coordination, communication as well as the preparation 
and implementation of SOE-related laws and regulations.129
In fact, the report of MPI revealed that the recent model of State capital 
management has been a major factor behind insufficient supervision, lack 
of market-driven decision-making and economic efficiency and growth. 
The establishment of a highly concentrated entity, with the broad and 
comprehensive authority over SOEs, and employing sufficient team of 
skilled and experienced personnel has been critically important and necessary 
when taking into account the current circumstances.130 This necessity must 
have been foreseen as the recent entity, the Committee Commission for 
the Management of State Capital at Enterprises – CMSC was set up by the 
Resolution No. 09/NQ-CP131 and the Decree No. 131/2018/ND-CP 
(Decree 131). This entity shall be responsible for supervising and managing 
126 Decision No. 2092/QD-TTg of Prime Minister (2011) which was a afterwards partly amended 
by the Decision No. 1039/QD-TTg (2016).
127 Decision No. 1039/QD-TTg of Prime Minister (2016), Art.1.
128 For example, the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) is solely mandated to coordinate 
with PVN to resolve the consequences of inefficient energy projects, such as PVTex’s Ding 
Vu fibre plant, 3 bio-ethanol plants, and Dung Quat Shipyard, retrieved from http://www.
moit.gov.vn/tin-chi-tiet/-/chi-tiet/tap-%C4%91oan-dau-khi-viet-nam-tap-trung-xu-ly-
dut-%C4%91iem-cac-du-an-chua-hieu-qua-6301-16.html [accessed 22 June 2019].
129 ADB (n 115), p.6.
130 Bao Chinh Phu (the Government’s Portal) (2018), ‘The “Super” Committee and the role in 
State Capital Management’, 20 September 2018, retrieved from http://baochinhphu.vn/Kinh-
te/Sieu-Uy-ban-va-vai-tro-quyet-dinh-trong-nang-tam-quan-tri-von-nha-nuoc/347191.
vgp [accessed 22 June 2019].
131 The Resolution No. 09/NQ-CP of Government on establishing the Committee managing the State 
capital in enterprises (2018).
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the State capital in 7 economic groups, and 12 general corporations with a 
value of over VND5 quadrillion.132
The question is that whether the new Committee shall be competent 
enough to supervise a large number of SOEs doing business in very different 
lines of businesses and highly specialised sectors remains to be seen. Firstly, 
there is a concern on the human resources because apart from the board of 
management directly assigned by the Prime Minister, the number of staffs in 
2018 shall be around 50, including personnel transferred from the relevant 
Ministries and the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC). Unlike 
the corporations who could employ the most competent personnel with 
negotiable benefits, the Committee - a governmental authority - has to 
follow the civil service recruitment procedures and can only offer the table/
level of salary under the 2008 Law on Cadres and Civil Servants.133 Salaries 
available are well below the amounts available in comparable companies in 
the private sector. Thus, such factors are likely to hinder the efforts to recruit 
experts with international experience in this field.
On the other hand, there is a valid concern that the newly established 
body would complicate the overlaps of competence and inconsistent practices 
among governmental agencies, because the State management over those 
sectors will not be eliminated. On the contrary, business registration system, 
tax regime, and SOE business management and governance will continue 
to follow the existing framework. Moreover, the spending of State budget 
would expand in line with the scale of the new Committee.134
The success of a sovereign fund investment – Temasek Holdings of 
Singapore – may be a valuable lesson for Vietnam. Most importantly, the clear 
separation between the Government’s role as a policymaker and regulator 
and that of Temasek Holdings as a shareholder and commercial owner of 
companies has driven the steady growth of the investment giant and helped 
Singapore to thrive as a nation.135 This corporate entity is fully owned by the 
Ministry of Finance, but its commitment to meritocracy, commercial discipline 
and accountability among the Temasek portfolio companies helps these 
firms become regional and global champions. Indeed, such companies could 
compete freely in a globally competitive and customer-focused marketplace. 
It is unlike many SOEs around the world that are protected from competition 
and cushioned from corporate realities through subsidies. Some of these SOEs 
may also become instruments to achieve politically-driven agendas.136
132 The Decree No. 131/2018/ND-CP (2018), Art.9(2).
133 The Law on Cadres and Civil Servants No. 22/2008/QH12 (2008).
134 The Government’s Portal (n 129).
135 Lee, Y.N. (2014), ‘Temasek’s success down to separation of its role from Govt’s’, Today 
News, 23 December 2014, retrieved from https://www.todayonline.com/business/temaseks-
success-down-separation-its-role-govts [accessed 22 June 2019].
136 Ibid.
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Returning to Vietnam, the good signal that the primary purpose of 
the new Committee is not to govern the daily operations of SOEs, but 
it shall focus on managing the State capital as shareholders exercise their 
rights under the enterprises laws and corporate charters. Thus, the important 
matter is not the establishment of the new entity. Rather, what is more 
essential is the structural organisation, and the procedure to facilitate 
corporate performance and to enhance the transparency, accountability and 
the supervision of people – the ultimate owners of the State assets.137
Another key question within the first recommendation is the possibility for 
foreign investors to further engage in the equitisation process. According to the 
report of the State Securities Commission by the end of previous equitisation 
plan, the participation rate of foreign investors was only 9.5 percent, well below 
the target of 16.7 percent. Additionally, a report of the CIEM has shown that 
among the 46 corporations named for acquisition under the approved plan for 
the 2011 – 2016 period, only 4 of them sold their shares to foreign strategic 
investors, accounting for only 8.7 percent.138 Against this backdrop, it can be 
concluded that the small scale of proportion of shares sold to strategic investors 
is one of the main reasons why SOEs equitisation becomes less attractive. 
Despite of the new and enabling legal provisions on the ownership ratio of 
foreign investors, the engagement of foreign investors is still controlled. For 
example, the Decree No. 60/2015/ND-CP (which amended the Decree 
No. 58/2012/ND-CP) guiding the 2010 Securities Law, provided that the 
maximum foreign ownership regarding the public companies operating in the 
conditional business lines can be up to 49 percent.139
This restrictions on the foreign ownership may be designed to create a 
barrier for the protection of young domestic industries. However, they result 
in a negative impact on attracting strategic foreign shareholders because by 
holding very small ownership ratio, foreign investors are unable to engage 
in the management of the company effectively and drive the company 
forward for positive changes and profits. There is no valid rationale for 
strategic investment and the potential for conflict of interest and oppression 
of other shareholders.140 Even if the ownership ratio could not be amended, 
strengthening the rights of minority shareholders could act as an important 
step in attracting more investors into SOEs’ IPOs. For example, one practical 
measure which could be taken is amending the corporate charter of equitised 
137 The Government’s Portal (n 129)
138 Customs Newspaper (n 105).
139 The Decree No. 60/2015/ND-CP (2015), Art.2a, sub-article 1(b): Where a public company 
operates in the investment and business sector subject to conditions applied to foreign investors 
but none of specific regulations on the rate of foreign ownership, the maximum rate of foreign 
ownership will be 49%.
140 Customs Newspaper (n 105).
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SOEs to allow strategic investors to hold a veto right on a predetermined set 
of issues, regardless of shareholding ratio.141
The second group of recommendations concentrates on improving the 
governance and performance of SOEs. Foremost, reducing the complexity 
and conflicting mandates of services delivered by SOEs is critically important. 
In order to improve their commercial performance, SOEs need to have clear 
market driven objectives and the same commercial discipline imposed on 
private corporations. Any non-commercial services which they are required 
to deliver but cannot be done on a fully commercial basis should be clearly 
mandated and publicly disclosed.142
For example, given that the national oil company – PVN – is the 
meant to fulfil some political goals,143 the Decision No. 1749/QD-TTg on 
the Development of PVN Strategy Plan to 2025, with a vision forwards 
2035,144 and the Decision No. 12119/QD-BCT145 of Ministry of Industry 
and Trade stated that during the progress of PVN restructuring, the role of 
this company shall focus on two essential functions: 
1. The commercial activities with four pillars exploration and
production, natural gas, electricity, and petroleum processing; and
2. Very limited non-commercial goals whereas the regulatory function
shall be removed out of its key objectives.146
It goes without saying that the government ought to ensure financial 
integrity and enforcement of corporate governance requirements effectively 
by relevant law enforcement authorities. Although the Vietnamese 
Government has articulated a clear vision and policy on improving the 
governance of SOEs by legal reform, implementation of these new legal 
provisions has been uneven – particularly in regards to increased transparency 
and disclosure of enterprise finances and operations. For instance, there is 
a legal requirement for public disclosure of information related to SOE 
corporate performance, including on enterprise websites;147 however, there 
has been limited success as the results indicate that only 265 out of 622 SOEs 
complied with such provisions in 2017.148
141 ADB (n 115), p.6.
142 Ibid., p.7.
143 The Decision No. 1855/QD-TTg (2007), Art. 1.2(a).
144 Decision No. 1749/QD-TTg (2015).
145 Decision No. 12119/QD-BCT of MOIT approving the Restructuring Petroleum Industry Plan to 
2020 (2015).
146 Decision	No.	12119/QĐ-BCT	of	MOIT	on	Approval	the	Restructuring	Petroleum	Industry	
Plan to 2020, with a vision to 2030 (2015), Art. 1, I – Objectives and Orientation, 2(a) – 
Overall Objectives.
147 Decree No. 81/2015/ND-CP (2015), Art.5; Decree No. 50/2016/ND-CP (2016), Art.6
148 Thoi bao Tai Chinh Vietnam (2018), ‘Publicize the list of SOEs who have to publish information’, 18 
March 2018, retrieved from http://thoibaotaichinhvietnam.vn/pages/kinh-doanh/2018-03-18/
phan-lon-dnnn-chua-thuc-hien-cong-bo-thong-tin-day-du-55001.aspx [accessed 22 June 2019].
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Furthermore, although many SOE restructuring plans have been 
approved, there is little publicly available information about the processes by 
which these plans were developed and executed. This lack of information 
raises uncertainties for the private sector and civil society. Improved 
consultation and information disclosure would significantly improve investor 
confidence and public perceptions on and support for these schemes. To 
address this situation, the current process of reporting to parent ministries 
and the Ministry of Finance can be changed by establishing a streamlined 
mechanism whereby a single entity is in charge as the focal point to collect 
and publish SOEs disclosure on its portal publicly.149 This entity could easily 
be the newly established Committee as mentioned above.
Finally, enhancing corporate governance of SOEs is a key solution for 
attracting investment and realising a competitive market  and increasing 
profit, productivity and quality. From a corporate governance perspective:
The management of a national oil company (NOC) has a major impact on how 
well oil producing countries translate potential wealth into sustainable development that 
benefits citizens. An effective NOC can generate stable financial returns to the state, 
national technical capability, and strong commitments on environment and society. 
Inversely, mismanaged NOC often exacerbate waste and corruption and deprive the 
country of valuable resources.150
Therefore, the adequate oversight and control exercised by the 
shareholders seem to be the primary importance in order to reduce information 
asymmetries and the potential for managerial rent-seeking. According to some, 
corporate governance of SOEs is typically sub-standard compared to parctices 
in non-State/private sectors.151 Unlike the business entities governed by the 
Law on Enterprises, the article of association and charter of PVN is governed 
by separate Government’s Decree, particularly the Decree No. 149/2013/
ND-CP and supplementary MOIT’s legal documents.152 Pursuant to these 
legal provisions, the MOIT and MOF shall jointly assign three independent 
auditors who are responsible for overseeing the legality, care and prudence 
of both board of directors and the CEO in regards to practicing the rights of 
shareholders and managing the business operation of PVN.153
Some of the recommendations focus on the Board of Directors (BODs) 
who should provide the management with a clearly stated mission related 
to resource development. In order to ensure that the missions are sound 
and well informed, those directors should be selected and appointed based 
149 Tordo, S. et al. (n 38), pp.38-39
150 Heller, P.R.P. et al. (n 40), p.3. 
151 Tordo, S. et al. (n 38), p.54.
152 Decision No. 3911/QD-BCT of MOIT (2014).
153 Decree No. 149/2013/ND-CP on Charter of PVN (2013), Arts. 37 and 38.
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on their professional qualifications, experience and ability to ensure the 
owner’s interests are well served, not based on their political affiliations. In 
addition, the CEO, instead being assigned by political organisations, should 
be recruited publicly, via competitive selection or hiring an experienced 
director from international oil companies.154
Aside from the BODs and CEO, both the Law on Enterprises and 
Decree No. 149/2013/ND-CP have emphasised the important role of the 
Board of Supervisors (BOSs) within the corporate structure. For example, 
the MOIT and MOF shall jointly assign three independent auditors who 
are responsible for overseeing the legality, care and prudence of both board 
of directors and the CEO in regards of practicing the rights of owner’s 
representatives, managing the business operation of PVN.155
In short, recommendations can be clustered under two key areas: 
Firstly, the role of government in paving way to the investment eco-
system, including legal reforms and strengthening institutional coordination, 
incentivising and protecting the rights of investors during SOEs restructuring. 
Secondly, the requirements on accountability and performance of SOEs by 
applying internationally accepted, good governance practices. 
5. Conclusion
This paper has critically analysed the frictions and concerns pertaining
to the relationship between privatisation and competition in the Vietnamese 
oil and gas market since the initial determination by government to gradually 
build a free and fair sector in line with its strategic plan with the vision 
to 2050.156 The paper has identified a number of sectors specific examples 
whereby the acceleration of key energy SOEs’ equitisation and facilitating 
market access, particularly in petrol retail market has been instigated. 
While the optimum potential for investment and growth in this sector 
has not been achieved yet, the participation of a small number of foreign-
owned companies will at least provide a positive signal for competition 
whilst creating pressure on domestic petroleum distributors to upgrade 
their existing facilities and improve service and product quality. Moreover, 
inclusion of foreign stakeholders is likely to kindle the necessary SOEs’ 
corporate governance reforms that meet the requirements of non-State 
investors, especially those of the foreign strategic partners.
Several recommendations that have been put forward come under two 
main themes: legal reform and corporate governance practices which in tandem 
would lead to a more competitive, efficient and profitable energy sector.
154 Cameron, P.D. & Stanley, M. C. (2017), Oil, Gas and Mining – A Sourcebook for Understanding the 
Extractive Industries, The World Bank’s the Extractive Industries Source Book (EISB), p.126.
155 Decree No. 149/2013/ND-CP on Charter of PVN (2013), Arts.37 and 38.
156 The Decision No.1855/QD-TTg (2007).
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